On this page 18 sections
- Choosing Arbitration
- The Agreement Itself
- Certainty of Intention
- Who Is Bound
- Separability
- Suit Despite Clause
- The 2015 Rewrite
- What Cannot Be Arbitrated
- Stamp Duty Detour
- After the Award
- The Section 34 Grounds
- Public Policy's Journey
- Patent Illegality
- Can Courts Modify?
- Appeals and Enforcement
- Two Gates Compared
- Unsettled Edges
- Quick Answers
Commercial contracts commonly contain an arbitration clause of a few lines, by which the parties agree that disputes between them shall be referred to arbitration rather than to the ordinary courts. The consequences of that clause are considerable: it determines the forum before which a dispute will be heard, the extent to which a court may examine the proceedings, and whether the resulting award may be set aside.
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 governs that clause and everything that follows from it. This article follows a domestic arbitration through its life in court: what makes a valid arbitration agreement, what a court must do when a party sues despite one, which disputes cannot go to arbitration at all, on what grounds an award can be set aside, and how it is enforced.
Cases at a glance 16
- McDermott International v. Burn Standard
- Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander
- Alchemist Hospitals v. ICT Health Technology Services
- Cox and Kings v. SAP India
- Hindustan Petroleum v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums
- Sukanya Holdings v. Jayesh Pandya
- Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation
- Booz Allen Hamilton v. SBI Home Finance
- A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam
- Emaar MGF Land v. Aftab Singh
- Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority
- ONGC v. Saw Pipes
- Ssangyong Engineering v. NHAI
- Delhi Airport Metro Express v. DMRC
- Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies
- Hindustan Construction Co. v. Union of India
Choosing Arbitration
Arbitration is adjudication by a private tribunal that the parties themselves choose. It rests on consent: no one can be sent to arbitration without having agreed to it. Once the parties have agreed, the Act protects their choice, chiefly by keeping the courts out. Section 5 says:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part."
The section does not abolish judicial control. It confines it to the points the Act itself names: reference to arbitration under Section 8, interim measures under Section 9, appointment of arbitrators under Section 11, setting aside under Section 34, appeals under Section 37 and enforcement under Section 36. Anywhere else, the court has no role.
In McDermott International v. Burn Standard (2006) the Supreme Court explained the limited nature of that role:
"The court cannot correct errors of the arbitrators. It can only quash the award leaving the parties free to begin the arbitration again if it is desired."
The Court said parties who choose arbitration make a conscious decision to exclude the court's jurisdiction because they want speed and finality. Most of the case law below is an attempt to honour that decision without leaving a party without any remedy at all.
The Agreement Itself
Section 7(1) defines an arbitration agreement as
"an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not."
Each phrase has a job. "All or certain disputes" lets the parties send everything, or only some kinds of dispute, to arbitration. "Which have arisen or which may arise" covers both a dispute that already exists and one that may come up in future. "A defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not" means the relationship need not be a contract; a claim in tort arising out of the parties' dealings can be covered.
Section 7(2) deals with form. The agreement may be an arbitration clause in a contract or a separate agreement. In practice the two serve different purposes. A clause is written in advance, while the relationship is friendly, to cover disputes nobody can yet foresee.
A separate agreement, often called a submission agreement, is usually made after a dispute has arisen, when both sides decide to take that dispute out of court. The Act treats both alike, and an agreement about an existing dispute is equally valid whether it sits in the main contract or stands alone. UPSC set exactly this point in 2015.
Section 7(3) requires the agreement to be in writing, and Section 7(4) says when it is. It is in writing if it is contained in a document signed by the parties; in an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication, including electronic communication, which provide a record of the agreement; or in an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which one party alleges the agreement and the other does not deny it.
The last of these is worth noticing. An agreement can come into being in the arbitration itself: if a claimant asserts that the parties agreed to arbitrate and the respondent files a defence without denying it, the requirement of writing is met.
Section 7(5) adds incorporation by reference. A contract that refers to another document containing an arbitration clause brings that clause in, provided the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make the clause part of the contract.
This is common in construction, where the main contract refers to general conditions that contain the clause.
What the section does not require is just as important. No particular words are needed, no signature is needed if the exchange of communications provides a record, and the clause need not use the word "arbitration". What matters is the substance of what the parties agreed.
Certainty of Intention
A clause can be in writing and still fail, because it does not show that the parties actually agreed to arbitrate. The leading case is Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander (2007). A partnership deed provided that disputes would be decided by the partners, or "shall be referred for arbitration if the parties so determine". The Supreme Court held this was not an arbitration agreement. The words, it said, must
"disclose a determination and obligation to go to arbitration and not merely contemplate the possibility of going for arbitration."
The Court listed the attributes of an arbitration agreement, which apply even where the word arbitration is not used. The agreement must be in writing. The parties must have agreed to refer present or future disputes to a private tribunal. The tribunal must be empowered to decide impartially, after giving each side a chance to be heard. And the parties must have agreed to be bound by its decision.
It then drew the line that most later cases apply:
"Any agreement or clause in an agreement requiring or contemplating a further consent or consensus before a reference to arbitration, is not an arbitration agreement, but an agreement to enter into an arbitration agreement in future."
A clause that says disputes "may" be referred to arbitration if the parties agree, or that the parties "can, if they so desire" arbitrate, leaves the decision for later. It is a statement of hope, not an obligation.
The Court reaffirmed this in Alchemist Hospitals v. ICT Health Technology Services (2025). The clause there provided for negotiation and then mediation, after which the parties were expressly free to go to the civil courts.
Nothing in it showed an intention to refer disputes to a private tribunal and abide by its decision, and the Court held it was not an arbitration agreement. The judgment restated the rule that the mere use of the word "arbitration" or "arbitrator" does not make a clause an arbitration agreement if it contemplates fresh consent before the reference.
The test, in short, is commitment. A clause that binds both sides to arbitrate, and to accept the result, is an arbitration agreement whatever words it uses. A clause that only keeps arbitration open as an option is not, whatever words it uses.
Who Is Bound
An agreement binds its parties, but modern business is carried on through groups of companies, and the company that signs is not always the one that performs. Can a company that never signed the agreement be bound by it?
A Constitution Bench answered in Cox and Kings v. SAP India (2023). Its conclusions include these: the definition of "parties" under Section 2(1)(h) read with Section 7 includes both signatory and non-signatory parties; the conduct of a non-signatory may indicate its consent to be bound; and
"The requirement of a written arbitration agreement under Section 7 does not exclude the possibility of binding non-signatory parties"
The Court kept the group of companies doctrine, but grounded it in consent rather than in the idea that a group is a single economic unit. The question in each case is whether the non-signatory, by its role in the negotiation, performance or termination of the contract, showed a mutual intention to be bound.
The Court also distinguished a "party" from a person "claiming through or under" a party, who takes the agreement by derivation.
At the referral stage, the Bench said, the court should leave it to the arbitral tribunal to decide whether a non-signatory is bound.
A three-judge Bench applied that direction in Cox and Kings (2024), appointing an arbitrator and leaving the question of the non-signatory to the tribunal.
Separability
An arbitration clause sits inside the contract it governs. If a party says the whole contract is void, does the clause fall with it? Section 16(1)(a) says no:
"an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract."
Section 16(1)(b) adds that a decision of the tribunal that the contract is null and void does not by itself invalidate the clause. Without this rule, any party could defeat arbitration by alleging that the main contract is invalid.
The same section gives the tribunal power to rule on its own jurisdiction, including objections about the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.
A plea that the tribunal lacks jurisdiction must be raised no later than the statement of defence; a plea that it is exceeding its authority must be raised as soon as the matter arises.
If the tribunal rejects such a plea, it continues and makes its award, and the aggrieved party may then challenge the award under Section 34. Section 37(2) allows an immediate appeal only where the tribunal accepts the plea and so declines jurisdiction.
Suit Despite Clause
A party bound to arbitrate sometimes files a civil suit anyway. Section 8 tells the court what to do. As first enacted, it said the judicial authority before which such an action is brought
"shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration."
The word "shall" leaves the court no discretion once the conditions are met. In Hindustan Petroleum v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums (2003) the Court said that where there is an arbitration clause, "it is mandatory for the Civil Court to refer the dispute to an arbitrator".
The application must come before the applicant's first statement on the substance of the dispute, so a party who files a written statement on the merits and only then asks for arbitration has given up the right.
Section 8(2) requires the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy to accompany the application. Section 8(3) allows the arbitration to begin or continue, and an award to be made, while the application is pending.
A suit sometimes includes parties or claims outside the arbitration agreement. In Sukanya Holdings v. Jayesh Pandya (2003) the Court held that Section 8 does not allow a court to split such a suit:
"it would be difficult to give an interpretation to Section 8 under which bifurcation of the cause of action that is to say the subject matter of the suit"
is possible. Splitting would create a procedure the Act does not contemplate. So where the subject matter cannot be separated, the whole suit stays in court.
The 2015 Rewrite
The 2015 amendment rewrote Section 8(1). The judicial authority must now refer the parties to arbitration, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any court, "unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists".
The amended text also covers a person claiming through or under a party. A proviso to Section 8(2) deals with the case where the original agreement is held by the other side: the applicant files a copy with a petition asking the court to call for the original.
The phrase "prima facie" sets the depth of the court's inquiry. In Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation (2020) a three-judge Bench described it this way:
"Prima facie examination is not full review but a primary first review to weed out manifestly and ex facie non-existent and invalid arbitration agreements and non-arbitrable disputes."
Where the court cannot decide the point on a prima facie view, it refers the parties, and the tribunal decides. The Court applied the same standard to appointment of arbitrators under Section 11, although Section 11 does not use the same words. Its approach is often summed up as "when in doubt, refer".
The amendment also made an order refusing to refer the parties under Section 8 appealable under Section 37(1)(a); an order referring them is not appealable.
What Cannot Be Arbitrated
Even a valid agreement cannot send every kind of dispute to a private tribunal. Some matters belong only to courts and public bodies. In Booz Allen Hamilton v. SBI Home Finance (2011), a mortgage suit, the Court held that when Section 8 is invoked,
"all aspects of arbitrability have to be decided by the court seized of the suit, and cannot be left to the decision of the Arbitrator."
It gave a general rule, while noting that it is not rigid:
"all disputes relating to rights in rem are required to be adjudicated by courts and public tribunals, being unsuited for private arbitration."
It named the well-recognised non-arbitrable disputes: criminal offences, matrimonial disputes, guardianship, insolvency and winding up, testamentary matters, and eviction or tenancy matters governed by special statutes.
But it also noted that "disputes relating to sub-ordinate rights in personam arising from rights in rem have always been considered to be arbitrable".
Vidya Drolia turned this into a four-part test. A subject matter is not arbitrable when the dispute:
- relates to actions in rem that do not concern subordinate rights in personam arising from rights in rem;
- affects third-party rights, has erga omnes effect, or requires centralised adjudication;
- relates to inalienable sovereign and public interest functions of the State; or
- is expressly or by necessary implication non-arbitrable under a mandatory statute.
Applying the test, the Court treated insolvency, intra-company oppression and mismanagement, patent and trademark validity, criminal cases, divorce and probate as non-arbitrable. It overruled an earlier view on tenancies:
"Landlord-tenant disputes governed by the Transfer of Property Act are arbitrable as they are not actions in rem but pertain to subordinate rights in personam that arise from rights in rem."
Tenancies covered by a rent control law that gives a particular forum exclusive jurisdiction stay outside arbitration.
Allegations of Fraud
For years a party could avoid arbitration simply by alleging fraud. In A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam (2016) the Court narrowed that escape. It distinguished serious allegations of fraud, which make a matter fit only for a civil court, from ordinary allegations made in pleadings, and held that
"mere allegation of fraud simplicitor may not be a ground to nullify the effect of arbitration agreement between the parties."
The court may refuse to refer only in two situations: where the allegations are so serious that they make out a virtual case of a criminal offence, or where they are so complicated that only a civil court, weighing voluminous evidence, can properly decide them. Everything short of that goes to the tribunal.
Consumer Disputes
Builders often put arbitration clauses in flat-purchase agreements, then invoke Section 8 when a buyer goes to a consumer commission. In Emaar MGF Land v. Aftab Singh (2018) the Court upheld the National Commission's view that an arbitration clause in such an agreement does not take away the consumer forum's jurisdiction, even after the 2015 amendment to Section 8.
The consumer law gives an additional, public remedy, and the consumer forum is not obliged to send the buyer to arbitration.
Stamp Duty Detour
A different obstacle arose from stamp law. Many contracts containing arbitration clauses are not stamped, or not stamped enough. Could a court refuse to act on the clause until duty was paid?
In 2023 a seven-judge Bench answered in In re Interplay between Arbitration Agreements and the Indian Stamp Act. An unstamped agreement is inadmissible in evidence but not void, and the defect is curable. It held:
"An objection as to stamping does not fall for determination under Sections 8 or 11 of the Arbitration Act. The concerned court must examine whether the arbitration agreement prima facie exists;"
Stamping objections go to the arbitral tribunal. A court hearing a Section 8 application asks only whether an arbitration agreement exists on its face, which keeps the referral stage short.
After the Award
Once the tribunal decides, the Act allows no appeal on the merits. Section 34(1) provides the only route:
"Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3)."
Section 35 makes the award final and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them. The court reviewing an award is not deciding the dispute again. In Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority (2014) the Court said it
"is not a first appellate court and cannot interfere with errors of fact."
An arbitrator may therefore be wrong on the facts, or reach a view of the contract the court would not have taken, and the award will still stand. What the court checks is the integrity of the process and a narrow set of legal limits. The sections that follow describe those limits.
The Section 34 Grounds
Section 34(2)(a) lists grounds the applicant must establish. Since the 2019 amendment, they must be established on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal, not on fresh evidence. The applicant must show that:
- a party was under some incapacity;
- the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties subjected it, or failing that, under Indian law;
- the applicant was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present its case;
- the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by the submission, or decides matters beyond its scope; or
- the composition of the tribunal or the procedure was not in accordance with the agreement or the Act.
Where an award decides some matters beyond the submission and they can be separated from the rest, only that part is set aside.
Section 34(2)(b) gives two grounds the court may find for itself: that the subject matter is not capable of settlement by arbitration, or that the award conflicts with the public policy of India.
Time is strict. The application must be made within three months of receiving the award, and the court may allow thirty days more for sufficient cause, but not beyond. The court may also, on request, adjourn the proceedings so that the tribunal can take steps that remove the ground for setting the award aside.
Public Policy's Journey
Public policy is the ground on which the courts' reach has expanded and shrunk most. As enacted in 1996, its explanation mentioned only an award induced or affected by fraud or corruption, or made in breach of Section 75 or 81 on confidentiality and the use of evidence from conciliation.
In ONGC v. Saw Pipes (2003) the Court widened it. Public policy, it said, would also cover an award that is patently illegal, alongside the fundamental policy of Indian law, the interest of India, and justice or morality. It added a limit:
"Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy."
In practice this opened the door to wide review, and later decisions extended it further. The 2015 amendment cut it back. An award now conflicts with the public policy of India only if:
- its making was induced or affected by fraud or corruption, or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81;
- it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or
- it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice.
A second Explanation stops public policy from becoming an appeal in disguise:
"the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute."
In Ssangyong Engineering v. NHAI (2019) the Court read these changes as a deliberate narrowing. The "interest of India" ground had gone. Conflict with justice now means an award that shocks the conscience of the court. And the fundamental policy of Indian law is limited to its basic principles, such as natural justice, not every breach of a statute.
Patent Illegality
The 2015 amendment moved patent illegality out of public policy and gave it a section of its own. Under Section 34(2A), for awards other than those in international commercial arbitrations, the court may set aside an award if
"the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award."
A proviso keeps it short of an appeal: an award shall not be set aside merely because the law was wrongly applied or by re-appreciating the evidence.
Ssangyong identified what remains. An award without reasons breaches Section 31(3) and is patently illegal. An arbitrator who reads the contract in a way no fair-minded person would, or who goes outside the contract, commits an error of jurisdiction. And a perverse finding is patently illegal:
"a finding based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality."
The Court also held that a mere contravention of the substantive law of India is no longer a ground by itself.
Courts have not always kept within these bounds. In Delhi Airport Metro Express v. DMRC (2021) the Supreme Court restored an award that the High Court had set aside, and warned:
"There is a disturbing tendency of courts setting aside arbitral awards, after dissecting and reassessing factual aspects of the cases to come to a conclusion that the award needs intervention"
The label of perversity or patent illegality, it said, cannot be used as cover for re-deciding the facts.
Can Courts Modify?
Section 34 speaks only of setting an award aside. For years the courts were divided on whether they could also correct it, and some decisions said a court reviewing an award could only set it aside or uphold it. In Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies (2025) a Constitution Bench held that the court
"has a limited power under Sections 34 and 37 of the 1996 Act to modify the arbitral award."
The power may be used to sever the invalid part of an award from the valid part, to correct clerical, computational or typographical errors apparent on the face of the record, and in some circumstances to modify post-award interest. The Court added that Article 142 of the Constitution is available, but must be used with great care and caution. The decision does not permit a court to rewrite an award on its merits.
Appeals and Enforcement
An appeal lies only from the orders listed in Section 37(1): refusing to refer the parties under Section 8, granting or refusing an interim measure under Section 9, and setting aside or refusing to set aside an award under Section 34. The 2019 amendment added the words "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force", so that no other law can open a different appeal.
Section 37(2) allows an appeal from an order of the tribunal accepting a plea under Section 16(2) or 16(3), or granting or refusing an interim measure under Section 17.
An award that survives is enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as if it were a decree of the court. Before 2015, the mere filing of a Section 34 application stayed enforcement automatically, which gave losing parties an easy way to delay payment for years. The substituted Section 36(2) provides that
"the filing of such an application shall not by itself render that award unenforceable, unless the Court grants an order of stay of the operation of the said arbitral award"
A stay needs a separate application, reasons recorded in writing, and such conditions as the court thinks fit. For money awards, the court must have due regard to the Code's provisions on staying a money decree, which usually means a deposit or security.
Parliament's 2019 amendment tried to confine this change to arbitrations begun after 23 October 2015 by inserting Section 87. In Hindustan Construction Co. v. Union of India (2019) the Supreme Court struck it down, holding that the deletion of the transitional provision and the insertion of Section 87 were
"struck down as being manifestly arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution of India."
The result is that no award, old or new, is stayed merely because a challenge has been filed.
Two Gates Compared
| Point | Section 8 reference | Section 34 challenge |
|---|---|---|
| Stage | Before the award, in a suit | After the award |
| Who applies | A party to the agreement, or one claiming through or under it | The party aggrieved by the award |
| Court's test | Prima facie, whether a valid agreement exists and the dispute is arbitrable | Only the grounds in Section 34(2) and (2A) |
| Time | Not later than the first statement on the substance | Three months, with thirty days more on sufficient cause |
| Result if successful | Parties sent to the tribunal | Award set aside, in whole or part, or modified within narrow limits |
| Appeal | Section 37(1)(a), only if reference refused | Section 37(1)(c) |
At the first gate the court asks only whether to let the arbitration begin. At the second it asks only whether the award has crossed a line the Act draws. At neither does it ask whether the arbitrator reached the right answer.
Unsettled Edges
The reach of modification. Gayatri Balasamy allows modification within limits, but where correction ends and rewriting begins will be worked out case by case, as will the use of Article 142.
Non-signatories at the door. Cox and Kings leaves the question of a non-signatory to the tribunal, but a court still has to decide whether a prima facie agreement exists against the party before it. How much examination that involves is not yet fixed.
Serious fraud. The line between serious and ordinary allegations of fraud, drawn in Ayyasamy, depends heavily on the facts of each case.
Discipline in Section 34. The statute has narrowed the grounds twice. Whether courts keep to them, as Delhi Airport Metro demanded, will decide whether arbitration delivers the finality the parties chose.
Quick Answers
Q: What must a clause contain to be an arbitration agreement?
It must be in writing and show a binding commitment to refer disputes to a private tribunal whose decision the parties will accept. A clause that needs further consent before the reference is only an agreement to agree.
Q: Can a non-signatory be bound by an arbitration agreement?
Yes. In Cox and Kings (2023) a Constitution Bench held that "parties" under Section 2(1)(h) read with Section 7 includes non-signatories whose conduct shows a mutual intention to be bound.
Q: When must a Section 8 application be made?
Not later than the date of submitting the first statement on the substance of the dispute, with the original agreement or a certified copy.
Q: Can a court set aside an award because the arbitrator got the law wrong?
Not merely for that. Section 34(2A) bars setting aside for an erroneous application of the law or by re-appreciating evidence, though patent illegality, such as a perverse finding, remains a ground.
Q: Does filing a Section 34 application stop enforcement?
No. Under Section 36(2) the award stays enforceable unless the court grants a stay on a separate application.
Sources: Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Sections 2, 5, 7, 8, 16, 34 to 37), with the 2015 and 2019 amendments; Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums (2003); Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya (2003); ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003); McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. (2006); Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander (2007); Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd. (2011); Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority (2014); A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam (2016); M/s Emaar MGF Land Limited v. Aftab Singh (2018); Ssangyong Engineering v. National Highways Authority of India (2019); Hindustan Construction Company v. Union of India (2019); Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation (2020); Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (2021); Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd. (2023 and 2024); In re Interplay between Arbitration Agreements and the Indian Stamp Act (2023); Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies (2025); M/s Alchemist Hospitals Ltd. v. M/s ICT Health Technology Services (2025); commentary on the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
